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Section 301 as an alternative method of enforcing rights under collective
agreements or should employees resort to state court actions with greater
frequency, the necessity of preserving a degree of coherence between
arbitration practice and rules of judicial decision would be heightened.
The successful reconciliation of the functions of the judiciary, NLRB,
and private arbitrators requires not only further definition of their respec-
tive jurisdictions but also the mutual understanding and respect which can
be achieved only through evolution of basic principles commanding com-
mon acceptance.
ARCHIBALD CoXt
EFFECTS OF TAXATION: INVESTMENTS BY INDIVIDUALS. By J. Keith
Butters, Lawrence E. Thompson, and Lynn L. Bollinger. Boston: Har-
vard Graduate School of Business Administration, Division of Research,
1953. Pp. xxxiv, 533. $6.25.
This work by Professor Butters and his Harvard associates, the
seventh and final volume in their series of studies of the effects of taxa-
tion on business, deals with questions which are at the very heart of the
battle raging in Congress at this writing in connection with the pending
tax revision bill. The bill, as passed by the House of Representatives,1
would reduce taxes on dividend income by an estimated $240 million in
the fiscal year 1955 and by $814 million in each year thereafter.' This
reduction is supported in part by the argument that a reduction in taxes
on dividend income will encourage investment in equity capital and there-
by contribute to the expansion of our economy. The Democratic op-
position, on the other hand, is urging, in lieu of a reduction in taxes on
dividends, increases in personal exemptions in order to offset the current
business recession.
In the great debate now going on, glib assumptions and facile
rationalizations are being widely substituted for facts, partly because of
the political character of the debate but also because of the lack of
empirical data as to many of the basic issues involved. The work by
Butters and his associates seeks to substitute factual data for conjecture
as to the impact of taxation on investment by individuals. And a striking
feature of the work is the extent to which the study negates postulates
accepted as gospel in many financial and investment circles.
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
2. H.R. REp. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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Before turning to the authors' findings, the methods employed in the
study should be noted. In seeking to make an empirical investigation of
the influences of federal taxation on individual investments, a list of
746 investors who did business with 53 investment banking houses or
securities dealers over the country was selected, with a view to obtaining
a representative sampling of varying income, wealth, and investment
policies. Personal interviews, based on an exhaustive questionnaire, were
had with the investors by staff members. Because a very large part of the
potential investment capacity is known to be concentrated in the higher
income levels, the authors used in their sampling 535 persons with incomes
above $7,500, an income group which represented in 1949 5 percent of the
population, of whom 353 had incomes of $12,500 or more. They also
utilized as their source-data questions included in surveys of investors
made by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.'
The authors have provided us with the most detailed study which
has been made of the impact of taxes on investment decisions-particularly
in the higher income levels. The sampling was, of course, a small one,
and the interviewing technique is open to some question as to how truth-
fully individuals report their actual motivations; this problem is intensified
by the antipathy of most high bracket taxpayers for tax collectors. Never-
theless, the elaborate and carefully prepared questionnaire, coupled with
the critical sifting and analysis of the data by the authors, tends to offset
these weaknesses of the method. Moreover, when one is dealing with the
elusive task of ascertaining the reasons for investments and the extent
to which taxes affect the judgment as to the investment to be made, men's
minds are being searched, and there appears to be no satisfactory alterna-
tive to the method used, which is widely employed in psychological and
sociological studies.
The authors start with the proposition that business must look mainly
to a very small proportion of the population,4 the upper 10 percent income
bracket, for individual investment in equity securities.5 Indeed, the
authors conclude that the top 3 percent of the population, with incomes
3. While the study was based on interviews had in 1949, the data were analyzed in
the light of developments taking place in 1950 and 1951. During that period, both
individual and corporate taxes increased; but at the same time the high level at which the
economy operated, the increased tempo of business, and the high level of individual sav-
ings (They increased from about $6 billion in 1949, to nearly $11 billion in 1950, and to
over $17 billion in 1951.) lead the authors to conclude that their results are substantially
applicable to 1952.
4. The authors note that American business obtained the bulk of its equity capital
for expansion and growth not from new stock issues but from retained earnings. P. 2.
This matter is considered at length in an earlier study in this series. See SMITH, EFFEcTS
OF TAXATION: CoRPoRATE FINANCIAL POLICY (1952).
5. Pp. 16-29, 122-143.
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of $10,000 or over and holding about 75 percent of all marketable secur-
ities owned by private investors, provide the major reservoir of individual
investment funds.6
The study does not substantiate the widely held belief in the business
and financial community that severe increases in tax rates have for all
practical purposes wiped out the capacity of individuals with large in-
comes to accumulate new investable funds. Instead, the writers find that
while changes in the tax structure made in the past five or ten years
have substantially reduced the capacity of the upper bracket taxpayers
to accumulate new investable funds, their remaining capacity is still very
large and, indeed, is much larger than is popularly supposed.
The fact that individuals in the high income brackets are still able to
accumulate large amounts of investable funds under existing tax rates,
makes it, in the authors' view, particularly important to determine the ex-
tent to which this potential equity capital reservoir has been absorbed
as a result of federal tax policies. In approaching this problem, the authors
divide investors into several categories. First, income and security minded
investors in the higher income levels, who place major emphasis on an
adequate income yield or on the preservation of their capital, tend to be
driven by income taxes from high yield common stocks into low yield
investments, such as government bonds. Such investors, particularly
those in the top wealth classes, are influenced by income and death taxes
to increase their holdings of cash, government bonds, and life insurance
at the expense of corporate securities. When the authors turn, however,
to the investors who are mainly interested in capital appreciation and are
typically prepared to take risks of capital loss, they find that the effects
of taxation are of an entirely different character. The single most im-
portant feature of the tax structure for these investors is, they find, the
preferentially low capital gains tax rate, which has stimulated venturesome
individuals to seek out investments offering prospects of capital gain.
Significantly, because investors normally expect to make a profit and not
suffer a loss, the authors found few instances in which individuals were
deterred from making investments because of the limited deductibility of
capital losses from ordinary income.
Turning from the types of investments into which investors put their
money, the authors studied the influence of taxation on the timing of the
buying and selling of securities. They sought to test the belief that the
capital gains tax accentuates fluctuations in the securities market by
discouraging the sale of securities on which there are large unrealized
capital gains, thereby reducing the supply of securities offered for sale
6. Pp. 25, 140; Cb. XVII.
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and exaggerating market booms. The conclusion reached is that the
timing of investment transactions was definitely inflfienced by the capital
gains tax, but the authors were unable to find that these tax influences
have in any sense been a dominant or major explanation of the swings
in securities markets. Moreover, the data conspicuously fail to provide
support for the charge that the capital gains tax impairs the transfer of
capital from existing securities to new ventures on any significant scale.
The combined estate, gift, and income tax structure creates, the
authors report, strong incentives for inter vivos and testamentary family
gifts in trust. The setting up of a trust creates a new income tax entity
beginning at the lowest tax bracket, removes wealth from the highest
estate tax bracket, and substitutes the lower gift tax rates (again starting
at the lowest rate bracket). These have been powerful incentives to the
wide use of gifts in trust, in which management and control of wealth
largely remain in the settlor. Moreover, with a life estate given to the
prime beneficiary and remainders over to the secondary beneficiaries,
ordinarily one generation of estate taxes is skipped.
Over-all, the authors find that the wide use of gifts in trust tends
to create a greater conservatism in investments than if the property were
held by the donor.' Corporate trustees in particular are traditionally and
openly conservative in their investments.' The magnitude of the effect of
trusts on investment policy may be indicated by the fact that in 1949
corporate trustees managed $50 billion in assets for the benefit of private
individuals-a sum approximately equal to the total policy reserves of all
life insurance companies in that year. Hence, the effects of trusteeships
in preventing the flow of funds into the stocks of less well-established
companies and new ventures is not inconsiderable. Curiously, therefore,
a major impeding tax effect on the venture capital market found by the
authors is one for which the government itself is only indirectly respon-
sible; but the conservatism of the one branch of the financial community
itself, the corporate trustee, bears the primary responsibility.
What impact do these findings, the principal factual conclusions of
the authors, have on the current revenue revision? Perhaps the most
striking conclusion suggested is that the continued favorable treatment
of gains on sales of securities-i.e., taxation of net capital gains at the
special 25 percent rate as contrasted with treatment as ordinary income-
is a significant factor in inducing investments in equity securities and
that the substantial disallowance of capital losses as deductions from
ordinary income is not a serious deterring factor. However, as the
7. Pp. 370-371.
8. Ibid.
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authors carefully point out, granting of preferential tax treatment of
capital gains poses d serious problem in tax equity in view of the taxation
at ordinary income rates of wages and salaries, authors' royalties, doctors'
and lawyers' fees, and the individual merchant's profits.' In weighing
the impact of the existing capital gains tax on the investment market
alongside considerations of equality in taxation, two of the authors favor
"heavier taxation of capital gains," while the third believes that "both on
equity and on economic grounds" the capital gains tax should be reduced."
The study sheds light on several facets of the current dividend tax
reduction controversy. One may fairly infer from the authors' findings
that a cut in the effective tax rate applicable to dividends will tend to
influence the more conservative and the income-minded investor to turn
more readily to equity securities than he now does-although such incen-
tives are not required to provide the equity capital needed by established
businesses during periods of over-all prosperity and optimism (which
are the only types of businesses in which this class investor will put his
money in any event). In times of depression, the authors point out that
the investment risks-not those concerning taxes but the risks of loss of
capital-would constitute the major factor which" would deter the ready
flow of funds into equity securities. Moreover, as they point out, the exist-
ence of tax-free havens for investments, such as tax exempt state and
local governmental securities and life insurance, appears to be a major
factor in diverting the funds of income and security-minded investors
away from corporate securities. The conclusion implicit in their study is
that the closing-up of those avenues of investor income tax escape could
exercise a highly important influence on the flow of funds into the
corporate securities market. And finally, one may infer from the study
that elimination of the tax advantage to the settlor of the family trust
would go far towards freeing large amounts of potential investment
capital for the equity securities market.
These are controversial conclusions not drawn by the authors but, in
this reviewer's judgment, implicit in the study. It does not follow that a
9. The justification for special treatment of capital gains provided by earlier statutes
under which the broad objective of the capital gains tax was to approximate the liability
which would have been incurred had the profit been realized ratably over the holding
period no longer exists under the current law. Thus, under the Revenue Act of 1934, 100
percent of the profit was taxed at ordinary income rates if the security or other capital
asset had been held for one year or less, 80 percent if the asset had been held for more
than one but not more than two years, 60 percent if the asset had been held for more than
two but not more than five years, 40 percent if the asset had been held for more than
five but not more than ten years, and 30 percent if the asset had been held for more than
ten years. INT. REv. CODE §117. Obviously, the rationale supporting the earlier statute
has no application to the present law under which there is a maximum 25 percent tax for
all capital assets held for more than six months. INT. REV. CODE §117(c).
10. P. 68.
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wise over-all tax policy would embody these conclusions in a taxing
statute. There may be strong countervailing considerations such as the
effects of taxation of income from state and local governmental securities
on the ability of hard pressed state and local governmental units to raise
money and the consequent impacts on the entire local governmental tax
and fiscal structure, which might make taxation of the income from
such securities unwise. Likewise, taxation to the settlor of the income
of family trusts would produce a whole host of other problems. In order
to prevent tax avoidance and to produce equity among taxpayers, such a
step might require taxation to the donor of all family income or at least of
income from property which has been the subject of gift whether or not
in trust. In short, the effects of a change in tax policy on the flow of
capital into the equity investment market is only one of many consider-
ations which must be weighed in shaping tax reform.
Facts have a way of being troublesome and disturbing to accepted
notions. The tax investment facts produced by this valuable study, which
constitutes an important contribution to the literature of the field, not
only serve to undermine a good deal of wishful assuming but in addition
suggest fresh and provocative lines of re-examination of tax policies
affecting individual investments.
JEROME R. HELLERSTEINt
t Assistant Professor of Law, New York University.

